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Abstract 
 
This paper provides a robust estimation of the impact of both product and labour market regulations 
on unemployment using data for 24 European countries over the period 1998-2013. Controlling for 
country-fixed effects, endogeneity and various covariates, results show that product market 
deregulation overall reduces unemployment rate. This finding is robust to all specifications and in 
line with theoretical predictions.  However, not all types of reforms have the same effect: 
deregulation of State controls and in particular involvement in business operations tends to push up 
the unemployment rate. Labour market deregulation, proxied by the employment protection 
legislation index, is detrimental to unemployment in the short run while a positive impact (i.e. a 
reduction of the unemployment rate) occurs only in the long run. Analysis by sub-indicators shows 
that reducing protection against collective dismissals helps in reducing the unemployment rate. The 
unemployment rate equation is also estimated for different categories of workers. While men and 
women are equally affected by product and labour market deregulations, workers distinguished by 
age and by educational attainment are affected differently. In terms of employment protection, 
young workers are almost twice as strongly affected as older workers. Regarding product market 
deregulation, highly-educated individuals are less impacted than low- and middle-educated workers. 
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I. Introduction 
With almost 20 million people1 unemployed in 2016, unemployment is and remains at the core 
of economic and social debate in Europe. The financial crisis in 2008 and the sovereign debt crisis 
which followed in Europe in 2013 significantly raised the unemployment rate. Unemployment rates are 
particularly high in some countries: as much as 23.6% in Greece and 19.6% in Spain in 2016 
compared to 8.4% and 8.2% respectively in 2007. Since standard macroeconomic tools such as 
monetary and fiscal policies are being already used and have their limits, structural reforms appear as 
a crucial ingredient for boosting economic growth and employment. This paper contributes to the 
debate by evaluating the effect of product and labour market deregulation on the unemployment rate.  
The economy-wide product market regulation (PMR) index computed by the OECD is used to 
estimate the level of regulation in 24 European countries2 over the period 1998-2013. The indicator 
covers all sectors and can be broken down by type of regulation thanks to the bottom-up approach 
used to compute it. State controls, barriers to entrepreneurship and barriers to trade can thus be 
assessed separately in order to find the most relevant deregulation policy to put in place to tackle 
unemployment. Labour market regulation is analysed through the OECD employment protection 
legislation (EPL) index, which can also be unbundled by type of contract (regular or temporary). 
The timing of structural reform implementation can be directly linked to the economic 
environment, leading to an endogeneity issue. Standard econometric methodologies would then 
provide biased estimates since the change in the unemployment rate can be due to a cyclical 
component rather than to the implementation of product and labour market reforms. I control for the 
potential endogeneity of PMR and EPL by using a fixed-effect regression model where lags of the 
difference with respect to the country means for the endogenous variables are used as instruments. 
Results show that a reduction of PMR reduces the unemployment rate whereas a drop in EPL 
increases it. Moreover, econometric tests do not support the existence of PMR and EPL endogeneity. 
The increase in unemployment does not affect all categories of workers equally. Young 
workers, less educated individuals and to a lesser extent women constitute vulnerable groups. Their 
average unemployment rates reached 18.2%, 16.2% and 8.7% respectively in 2016 in Europe3. These 
high unemployment rates encourage governments to implement targeted policies such as education 
improvement, reduction in childcare costs, activation policies, etc. In addition to these policies, it is 
interesting to assess the impact of structural reforms which are not specially designed to target 
vulnerable groups. I estimate the unemployment effect of PMR and EPL reforms by gender, age and 
education of workers. While men and women are equally affected, it appears that young workers and 
low- and middle-educated individuals are more affected by reforms than their counterparts. 
                                                             
1  Total number of people unemployed aged from 15 to 74 years in the 24 considered European countries. 
2  21 countries from the European Union (Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom) as well as Iceland, Norway and Switzerland. 
3  Average unemployment rate among the 24 European countries considered: total number of unemployed 
workers aged from 15 to 74 years old as a proportion of the total corresponding labour force. 
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A review of the existing literature on the effect of product and labour market reforms on 
unemployment is presented in the next section. This review also highlights previous findings on 
different types of deregulations (PMR and EPL) and on different types of workers. I contribute to this 
literature by analysing a longer period of time than previous studies which allows me to control for 
endogeneity of the regulatory variable and to find significant results. This paper also goes further in 
the analysis by considering sub-components of product and labour markets reforms as well as by 
analysing different groups of workers. Section 3 presents the database and defines PMR and EPL 
indices. It also describes which reforms took place in the past, and analyses the bivariate relationship 
between each index and the unemployment rate. Empirical results of the multivariate analysis are 
summarised in section 4. I distinguish by type of deregulation as well as by type of workers. The last 
section concludes by emphasising some limits of the study and proposes further research. 
II. Literature review 
Unemployment movements as well as heterogeneities across countries can largely be 
explained by interactions between macroeconomic shocks and economic institutions (Blanchard and 
Wolfers, 2000). Product market regulation and employment protection legislation are part of the 
equation. The first section is devoted to theoretical and empirical findings regarding the labour impact 
of product market regulation and employment protection legislation. The second section summarises 
the labour market situation, and in particular the unemployment rate, of different categories of workers 
and presents a survey of the literature on the labour impact of PMR and EPL for vulnerable groups. 
1. Theoretical and empirical findings on the impact of product and labour market 
(de)regulation on labour market outcomes 
In the theoretical literature, product market deregulation is usually defined as a reduction in 
barriers to entry or an increase in competition. Ebell and Haefke (2003) have studied the dynamic 
relationship between product market entry regulation and equilibrium unemployment and wages. They 
assume matching frictions, monopolistic competition in the goods market, multi-worker firms, individual 
wage bargaining and barriers to entry. They find a positive impact of product market deregulation on 
labour market outcomes: a reduction in entry barriers in the model brings down unemployment and 
pushes up wages.  
Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) distinguish between short-run and long-run effects. In their 
model, a reduction in entry costs has no effect in the short run since the number of firms is assumed to 
be fixed. The positive effect of deregulation comes only in the long run when new firms enter the 
market, implying a higher elasticity of demand and a lower mark-up. This in turn leads to lower 
unemployment and higher wages. Cacciatore et al. (2012) study the macroeconomic effects of a 
reduction in barriers to entry using a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model. They assume 
endogenous producer entry, equilibrium unemployment and costly job creation and destruction. In line 
with Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003), their results show a long-term effect but no short-term effect. 
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The story is different if an increase in product market competition is considered. In the 
Blanchard and Giavazzi model, firms are then facing more elastic demand associated with a lower 
mark-up in the short run. This, in turn, leads to both an increase in real wages and a fall in 
unemployment. In the long run, profits come back to their initial level, as do unemployment and wages. 
Using a general equilibrium model, Gerbach and Schniewind (2001) evaluate the final effect of 
promoting product market competition, without any distinction between short-run and long-run impact. 
They find a decline in the aggregate unemployment rate (although the unemployment rate can rise in 
some sectors). Amable and Gatti (2001) consider an increase in product market competition in a 
model of monopolistic competition with an endogenous determination of worker flows in and out of 
unemployment. Product market reform boosts the hiring rate as well as the separation rate, which can 
lead to a negative effect on unemployment depending on wage rigidities in the labour market. 
The empirical findings are in line with the theory and point to a decrease in unemployment 
(Amable et al. 2011, Bassanini and Duval 2006a, De Serres et al. 2012, Griffith et al. 2007) and an 
increase in employment (Berger and Danninger 2007, Boeri et al. 2000, Fiori et al. 2007, Nicoletti et al. 
2001, Nicoletti and Scarpetta 2005) if the product market is deregulated. Gal and Hijzen (2016) and 
Bordon et al. (2016) evaluate the impact over time and find a positive and increasing effect in the long 
run. The methodologies and results are presented in table 1. 
Depending on the type of product market deregulation implemented by governments, the 
expected impact on labour market outcomes can differ. Papers distinguish between State controls 
(e.g. public ownership), barriers to entrepreneurship (e.g. administrative burdens, regulatory opacity, 
barriers to entry), and barriers to trade (e.g. barriers to FDI). Regarding government interventions, 
results are contrasted. While some papers find a negative but not statistically significant impact of 
State control on employment (Boeri et al. 2000, Berger and Danninger 2006), Fiori et al. (2007) find a 
statistically significant positive relationship. Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2005) analyse the non-agricultural 
business employment rate (excluding public employment) and find a negative and statistically 
significant effect of public ownership. This implies that employment shifts, at least partially, from 
business to public sector as a result of an increase in public ownership. Regarding barriers to 
entrepreneurship and barriers to trade, the evaluated impact is always negative: more regulation 
would mean less employment (Fiori et al. 2007, Berger and Danninger 2006) even if the effect is 
sometimes not statistically significant (Boeri et al. 2000). 
Labour market factors – i.e. union density, employment protection, replacement rate, active 
labour market policies - are also at the core of unemployment researches. In this paper, I am 
particularly interested in employment protection legislation which aims to protect workers against 
abusive dismissals and provides (financial) compensation for the income loss associated with 
dismissals. Flexibility of employment protection is considered to be essential for rapid adjustments in 
the workforce to changing economic conditions and to reallocate labour towards more productive 
activities. 
In theory, more stringent employment protection legislation is modelled through an increase in 
the cost of firing staff. A priori, labour demand is thus negatively affected: firms reduce their hiring 
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rates and unemployment increases (Cahuc and Zylberberg, 1996, Bassanini and Duval 2006b). To 
compensate for higher dismissal costs, firms offer lower wages. However, severance pay can be seen 
as an additional income for workers. If workers are risk neutral, it does not matter if the income is 
coming from wages or severance pay. Wages adjust and the unemployment rate is not affected 
(Burda 1992). On the other hand, as the hiring rate declines, the average time job-seekers spend in 
unemployment before finding a new job increases, and unemployment becomes more costly. Workers 
are more willing to accept lower wages to maintain their jobs, and labour market equilibrium is restored 
(Blanchard 1999). As a result, employment protection lowers labour turnover (both hiring and lay-offs) 
and extends the duration of unemployment. The net effect on the aggregate unemployment rate 
remains ambiguous. 
Labour market deregulation through less stringent employment protection legislation can 
provide different results. In the short run, it leads to lower wages and thus higher profits for firms. It 
either has no effect on unemployment (Blanchard and Giavazzi 2003) or initially increases lay-offs 
more than it creates jobs and thus increases unemployment (Cacciatore et al. 2016). In the long run, 
higher profits attract new firms which hire new workers and thus the unemployment rate drops. 
Empirical estimates on the potential impact of EPL on (un)employment vary. While some 
papers find a positive effect of EPL deregulation on employment (Bordon et al. 2016, Berger and 
Danninger 2007, Boeri et al. 2000, Fiori et al. 2007) and a fall in unemployment (De Serres et al. 
2012), others find a statistically insignificant impact (Kugler and Pica 2008, Bassanini and Duval 
2006a, Belot and Van Ours 2004, Amable et al. 2011, Nicoletti and Scarpetta 2005) or even a 
negative impact on employment (Malk 2013). Studying 20 OECD countries during the period 1960-
1999, Baker et al. (2002) find that a large part of unemployment movements was mainly due to 
country-specific effects rather than institutional factors such as employment protection legislation. In 
sum, the empirics do not provide unambiguous results that could justify prescriptions for labour market 
deregulation. A detailed summary of the results and the estimation methods are provided in table 1. 
Employment protection reforms can be implemented either on regular or on temporary 
contracts and thus have different impacts on labour market outcomes. Bassanini and Duval (2006a) 
point out that a statistically insignificant aggregate impact of EPL on unemployment may mask two 
opposite effects. On the one hand, regulation on permanent contracts implies upward pressure on 
unemployment with a positive coefficient in the unemployment equation. On the other hand, stricter 
rules for temporary contracts can induce downward pressure on unemployment and a negative 
coefficient. However, both effects disappear when Spain is removed from the sample (Spain 
undertook the deepest reforms on permanent contracts over the period 1982-2003) and thus the 
empirical findings are not particularly robust. In a study of 21 OECD countries over the period 1985-
2007, De Serres et al. (2012) also found a positive but not statistically significant impact of permanent 
contract regulation on unemployment and a statistically insignificant negative effect of the share of 
temporary contracts on unemployment. By contrast, when analysing the change in employment, 
Berger and Danninger (2006) estimated a negative and statistically significant effect of regulation for 
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all types of EPL but with a larger impact for permanent contracts and protection against collective 
dismissals than for temporary contracts. 
The difference between levels of regulation for both types of contracts can also be crucial in 
determining the potential variation of unemployment. A stricter protection for permanent contracts 
compared to temporary contracts could raise the share of temporary contracts. However, this 
conclusion also depends on the initial level of regulation. If employment protection is initially strict for 
both types of contract, a weakening in rules for temporary contracts would raise the share of 
temporary contracts (Boeri et al. 2000). The reform of temporary contracts in Spain in 1984 is a good 
illustration since the use of fixed-term contracts dramatically increased from 10% at the beginning of 
the 1980s to 35% in the 1990s.  
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2. Vulnerable groups of workers and the potential effect of PMR and EPL4 
Women, young workers, old workers and the low-educated are considered as vulnerable 
groups in terms of employment. A large share of those types of workers is either inactive or 
unemployed. The unemployment literature has widely studied the reasons behind their weaker 
attachment to the labour market.  
Figure 1 - Unemployment rate for different types of workers  
(2016, average of the 24 considered European countries,  
in percentage of the corresponding labour force aged from 15 to 74) 
 
Source: EC. 
 Unemployment among young people appears to be one of the most highly sensitive variables 
in the labour market. It is directly linked to GDP growth: the youth unemployment rate falls during 
booms and rises during recessions. In addition, young workers are frequently mismatched in their 
employment (Shimer 2001). The employment process thus implies considerable searching and job 
changing before settling into a more or less permanent contract. In 2016, on average across European 
countries, 45% of the 15-24 year-old salaried workers had a temporary contract compared to 14% of 
the category aged from 25 to 49. Job match improves with age and older workers are often protected 
against job loss by seniority rights and because they have built up skills through experience. Despite 
job protection and the lower average unemployment rate, the possibilities of finding a new job decline 
with age. The net effect is that the long-term unemployment rate is higher for older workers. In 2016, 
60% of the unemployed workers over 50 years had been disconnected from the labour market for 
more than 12 months in Europe. This rate was 28% for the 15-24 age group and 47% for the 25 to 49 
age group. 
                                                             
4  All averages in this section correspond to the average for the 24 European countries considered, namely 
21 countries from the EU (Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, 
Sweden, United Kingdom) + Iceland, Norway and Switzerland. 
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In spite of the rise in their participation rate, from 52% in 1998 to 59% in 2016, there are still 
less women in the labour market than men, with a gap in the activity rate of 11 percentage points in 
2016. As emphasised by Jaumotte (2004), education, the functioning of labour markets and cultural 
attitudes (access to childcare, parental leave, integration) remain important determinants of female 
participation. Analysing 18 OECD countries over the period 1980-2007, Thévenon (2013) finds that 
childcare services, maternity leave and tax policies remain the most important drivers of increased 
female participation in the labour market. 
 Whatever the age or gender considered, unemployment is concentrated among those with the 
lowest level of education. Moreover, a large part of the increase in unemployment in Europe is due to 
a rise in joblessness among the low-skilled. The reason is a fall in demand for low-skilled workers. 
Competition from countries with low labour costs and technological progress are two factors often 
cited to explain labour demand shrinkage. However, as emphasised by Dolado et al. (2000), raising 
the educational attainment of the labour force does not always solve the unemployment problem 
unless other labour market rigidities are reduced. 
Among the wide range of literature on product and labour market regulations, only very few 
articles have considered their impact on the unemployment rate for different categories of individuals. 
Gal and Theising (2015) point out that low-educated people, the young, and the elderly tend to be 
more affected by structural reforms. They study employment protection legislation in particular and find 
a heterogeneous impact on various segments of the population. In their analysis, stricter regulation 
reduces employment for women and low-educated workers and pushes up employment for highly-
educated individuals. Bassanini and Duval (2006b) also find contrasting results depending on the type 
of workers, with a decrease in employment for young workers but an increase for older workers. As 
emphasised in the OECD (2004) Employment Outlook, by reducing turnover, employment protection 
reduces the job prospects for those with relatively weak attachment to the labour market, such as 
young workers and women. Those opposing effects may explain the difficulty in finding a robust 
impact of EPL on aggregate unemployment since the impact depends on the composition of the 
working-age population in terms of skills and demographic characteristics. Product market regulation 
seems to affect women more than men. Studying the impact of PMR on the employment rate for 20 
OECD countries over the period 1982-2003, Bassanini and Duval (2006b) estimate a statistically 
significant negative effect for women but no statistically significant impact for men. De Serres et al. 
(2012) provide similar results by studying the unemployment rate: a stricter regulation implies a higher 
unemployment rate for women but not for men. Those two articles also find that the impact depends 
on the age of workers: product market regulation affects older workers positively, through an increase 
in their employment rate (Bassanini and Duval 2006b), but affects young people negatively, through 
an increase in the unemployment rate (De Serres et al. 2012).  
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III. Data  
Our sample includes 24 European countries5 over the period 1998-20136. The two variables of 
interest, i.e. product market regulation (PMR) and employment protection legislation (EPL), are OECD 
indicators. The PMR index is updated every five years and currently covers the years 1998, 2003, 
2008 and 2013. The OECD collects information on regulatory structures and policies through a 
questionnaire sent to governments. Each answer is normalised over a zero to six scale, where a lower 
value means a low level of regulation. In a bottom-up approach, the numerical value of each question 
is first aggregated into 18 low-level indicators. They are then aggregated into seven mid-level 
indicators, which are in turn aggregated into three high-level indicators: State control, barriers to 
entrepreneurship, and barriers to trade and investment. An economy-wide indicator is then calculated 
based on the three high-level indicators. At each step of aggregation, a weighted average is used. 
 The indicators are insulated from context-specific assessments that are found in opinion 
surveys since they are based on objective data about laws and regulations. While the procedure 
ensures that the indicators are comparable across countries and over time, it has only limited 
information on how authorities implement the regulation and on informal regulatory practices. 
Figure 2: Product market regulation indicator – OECD definition 
 
Source: OECD. 
 The same bottom-up approach is used in the computation of the EPL indicator. The index is 
available for the period 1985-2013 and is computed every year. It combines information on strictness 
of employment protection for regular contracts (individual and collective dismissals) and on the use of 
temporary contracts. The indicator is compiled on the basis of statutory laws, collective bargaining 
                                                             
5  21 countries from the EU (Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, 
Sweden, United Kingdom) + Iceland, Norway and Switzerland. 
6 Table of descriptive statistics for all variables is in appendix. 
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agreements and case-law, with contributions of country experts. It is scaled from zero to six and rises 
with the level of strictness. Even though the complexity of employment protection legislation is difficult 
to summarise in an index, the EPL indicator provides a quantitative and comprehensive measure 
which is comparable across countries and over time. 
Figure 3: Employment protection legislation indicator – OECD definition
 
Source: OECD. 
Over the past fifteen years, product markets have been substantially liberalised in European 
countries: the average index fell from 2.22 in 1998 to 1.38 in 2013. Reforms took place in all countries 
analysed, with the biggest reduction occurring in Poland (-1.54), Hungary (-1.34) and Portugal (-1.29). 
Despite the 1.29 drop, Poland remains one of the most regulated European countries in 2013: it ranks 
22nd just ahead of Slovenia (23rd) and Greece (24th). The most competition-friendly in 2013 were the 
Netherlands, the United Kingdom and Austria. 
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Figure 4 – Product market reforms between 1998 and 20137  
(change in the PMR OECD index) 
 
Source: OECD. 
 In recent years, liberalisation of the product market has slowed down in European countries. 
Between 1998 and 2003, the average PMR score fell by 0.46 compared with 0.26 between 2003 and 
2008 and 0.14 between 2008 and 2013. The pace of reforms may have slowed down because most 
countries have already reached a low level of regulation. The potential benefits of further reforms are 
thus becoming smaller and liberalisation becomes harder over time. Three countries even introduced 
additional rules that inhibit competition: Ireland (with an increase in the PMR indicator by +0.1 over the 
period 2008-13), Iceland (+0.02) and Luxembourg (+0.02). On the other hand, Greece, Italy and Spain 
faced strong market pressure for structural reforms in 2011. While the PMR index for Greece came 
down by 0.47 points (the largest change over the period 2008-13), reforms have been more modest in 
Italy (-0.22) and Spain (-0.15). 
 On average across European countries, deregulation has mostly involved removing barriers to 
entrepreneurship (from 2.72 in 1998 to 1.62 in 2013), through simplification of the regulatory 
procedures and reduced protection of incumbents (e.g. lower barriers to entry). State control was 
limited by abolishing price controls (or at least by making them more competition-friendly). The State 
                                                             
7  Luxembourg, Slovak Republic, Estonia and Slovenia are not presented on the graph because data are not 
available at the beginning of the period. 
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control index fell by 0.93 points and reached a level of 2.13 in 2013. Public ownership remains high at 
an index of 2.72. Barriers to trade and investment were already low in 1998 (0.87) and continued to 
come down over time (0.39 in 2013), mainly because of discrimination against foreign suppliers fall. 
 The trend in reducing regulations is less strong in labour markets than in product markets. 
From an average score of 2.66 in 1998, European countries reached 2.46 in 2013. However, contrary 
to product market reforms, employment protection dropped back at an increasing rate over time: by -
0.01 points between 1998 and 2003, by -0.05 points between 2003 and 2008 and by -0.13 points 
between 2008 and 2013. This trend is not evenly spread over the 24 countries. Over the period 1998-
2013, five countries raised their dismissal costs, namely Ireland (+0.19), Germany (+0.14), the 
Netherlands (+0.04), Belgium (+0.03) and France (+0.03). On the contrary, other countries 
substantially reduced employment protection: the largest reform was in Portugal (-1.28), followed by 
the Slovak Republic (-0.63), Greece (-0.48) and Spain (-0.40).  
Figure 5 – Labour market reforms between 1998 and 2013 8 
(change in the EPL OECD index) 
 
Source: OECD. 
                                                             
8  Estonia, Luxembourg, Slovenia and Iceland are not presented on the graph since data on their EPL are 
available only over the period 2003-2013. 
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 The indicators for three types of employment protection legislation weakened over the period. 
The largest reduction in the index is observed for temporary contracts, with a decrease of 0.23, and it 
was also the lowest indicator at 1.71 in 2013. Individual dismissals were on average less costly in 
2013 than in 1998 with a reduction of the indicator by 0.22 points to reach a score of 2.18 in 2013. 
Employment protection in the event of collective redundancies remains high at 3.15 in 2013 (-0.15 
points compared to 1998). A high degree of protection of individual dismissals is not always 
associated with a high protection of collective redundancies and vice versa. For example, Belgium had 
in 2013 the highest index of collective employment protection legislation at 5.12 but a low score (well 
below the European average) for individual dismissals (1.81). On the contrary, Portugal had the 
highest score of individual protection (3.18) but was among the lowest score for collective 
redundancies (1.87). 
Figure 6 – Relationship between unemployment rate and regulatory indices 
(2013) 
 
 
Sources: EC, OECD. 
A high level of regulation in product and labour markets is not always associated with a high 
unemployment rate. Germany, for instance, had the third lowest unemployment rate in 2013, while its 
level of employment protection was the highest. In terms of regulation in the product market, 
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Switzerland was the fifth most highly regulated country but had the second lowest unemployment rate. 
There are also some counter-examples. The highest unemployment rate was found in Greece, which 
has the most highly regulated product market. Portugal also had a high unemployment rate (third rank) 
together with a high level of employment protection (fifth rank). Differences in unemployment rates can 
thus reflect institutional and economic features, but are also impacted by macroeconomic shocks. 
Countries with high unemployment rates tend to be countries which were more affected by the 
economic crisis.  
 A bivariate analysis of the regulatory indices with respect to unemployment rates shows a 
slightly negative correlation (-0.03) between employment protection and unemployment in 2013 and a 
slightly positive correlation (0.03) in 1998. The relationship between product market regulation and 
unemployment is always positive with a correlation of 0.28 in 1998 and 0.32 in 2013. 
IV. Empirical results 
To explore the institutional determinants of unemployment, in particular product market 
regulation and employment protection legislation, I first estimate the following equation: (1)ݑ௜௧ = ߚ଴ + ߚଵܲܯ ௜ܴ௧ + ߚଶܧܲܮ௜௧ + ߚଷ ௜ܺ௧ + ߚସܼ௜௧ + ߛ௧ + ߝ௜௧ 
where ݑ is the unemployment rate in country ݅ and in year ݐ; ܲܯܴ represents the product market 
regulation indicator; ܧܲܮ is the employment protection legislation index; ܺ groups control variables for 
other labour market policies (net replacement rate and union density); ܼ is a vector of control variables 
for macroeconomic factors (GDP gap, inflation and labour productivity); ߛ௧ is a time fixed effect and ߝ௜௧ 
is the error term. 
Control variables have been chosen depending on the availability of the data and based on 
previous research. Together with employment protection legislation, union density and the 
replacement rate are important factors for the unemployment rate. Higher union density raises the 
bargaining power of workers, hence increases wages which in turn reduces the number of workers 
hired, and thus increases the unemployment rate (Nickell and Andrews, 1983). The replacement rate 
(unemployment benefits received when not working relative to wages earned when employed) can 
also directly influence unemployment. Higher unemployment benefits put upward pressure on 
bargained wages and hence lower the equilibrium level of employment (Cahuc and Zylberberg 1996). 
This finding is largely confirmed by empirical literature (Brauninger 2000, Meyer 1980, Adams and Coe 
1990, Calmfors 1990, Acemoglu and Shimer 2000, Holmlund 1998) even if a high degree of 
uncertainty remains regarding the magnitude of the effect. Macroeconomic indicators constitute a 
second set of factors which can explain variation in the unemployment rate: inflation through the 
Phillips curve, the output gap, and a time-fixed effect to account for the impact of the business cycle 
and labour productivity growth.  
Estimating and testing a model using OLS involve some issues related with the use of time-
series cross-section data. Our data are characterised by a limited number of countries and a restricted 
period of estimation, which makes standard panel data estimation procedures problematic. By simply 
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applying pooled ordinary least squares method, the coefficient variability can be underestimated by 
50% or more (Beck and Katz 1995). To deal with standard error overconfidence, they propose a new 
estimation method: the panel corrected standard errors. By applying OLS with modified standard 
errors, panel corrected standard errors take into account panel heteroscedasticity and 
contemporaneous correlation of the error terms. This methodology is thus applied to our standard 
regression. 
Some heterogeneity across countries can be omitted or not fully captured by our explanatory 
variables. To control for this potential bias and to account for the specific characteristics of countries, 
all variables are estimated in difference with respect to the country mean (country-fixed-effect 
regression).  (2)(ݑ௜௧ െ ݑത௜) = ߚ଴ + ߚଵ(ܲܯܴ௜௧ െ ܲܯܴതതതതതതത௜) + ߚଶ(ܧܲܮ௜௧ െܧܲܮതതതതതത௜) + ߚଷ( ௜ܺ௧ െ തܺ௜) + ߚସ(ܼ௜௧ െ ҧܼ௜)
+(ߝ௜௧ െ ߝҧ௜) + ߛ௧  
Potential endogeneity of product market and labour market reforms constitutes another 
estimation issue. In fact, the effects of structural reforms may be endogenous to the economic 
environment in which reforms are conducted. Usually, in such cases, an instrumental variable 
regression is estimated, using the lagged values of the endogenous variables as instruments. In order 
to specify the optimal number of lags, a weak identification test (Cragg-Donald Wald F-stat) and an 
over-identification test (Hansen J-stat) are conducted. The tests suggest that a lag of two years can be 
used9.  
Depending on when the structural reform is implemented, the estimated impact can be biased. 
For example, the effect on the unemployment rate of a reform conducted shortly before an economic 
recovery is difficult to distinguish from the effect of the recovery itself. In this case, endogeneity 
induces an upward bias of the estimates. The contrary is true if the reform is implemented shortly 
before a downturn. Interestingly, the endogeneity tests contradict the assumption that effects of 
structural reforms are endogenous to the economic environment (the p-value is above the 0.10 
bound). This finding is in line with Bassanini and Duval (2009) and Fiori et al. (2007) who also find no 
evidence of reverse causality from unemployment to institutions. This absence of endogeneity could 
be explained by the fact that the regression estimates the impact of EPL and PMR level in year t on 
the level of unemployment rate on year t. Since structural reforms can take time to be implemented, it 
is reasonable to assume that the unemployment rate does not influence the current level of regulation 
in product and labour markets. In this case, the fixed-effect regression is unbiased by the business 
cycle and thus constitutes the best estimation that can be made. Since specifications for different 
types of regulation and different types of workers do not provide different results regarding the 
endogeneity issue, the analysis presented in the next sections will focus on the fixed-effect 
regressions. 
                                                             
9  Different lags, from 1 to 5 years, have been estimated for the IV regression. All specifications provide similar 
results. Coefficients of EPL and PMR remain statistically significant and of the same sign. Moreover, the 
evidence of no endogeneity remains for all estimations, even for the exactly identified model (lag of 1 year). 
See annexe 2 for the complete results. 
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1. Baseline regressions 
The baseline regression using year- and country-fixed effects provides a positive coefficient 
for PMR equal to 3.45. Any deregulation in the product market thus implies a reduction in the 
unemployment rate. More precisely, a drop in the PMR index by one standard deviation (0.45) is 
associated with a predicted drop of 1.5 percentage points of the unemployment rate. The magnitude of 
the effect seems particularly high. Nevertheless, descriptive statistics10 show that the average level of 
product market reforms over the period 1998-2013 corresponds to a decrease of the PMR index by 
0.29. The associated impact is therefore a reduction of 1 percentage point of the unemployment rate. 
In the more recent period, deregulation was slowed down by a fall of just 0.14 in the PMR index 
between 2008 and 2013. Further deregulation of the same extent as between 2008 and 2013 will then 
be associated with a reduction in the unemployment rate by 0.5 percentage point. 
By contrast, deregulation of the labour market measured by a reduction of the EPL index by 
one standard deviation (0.46), was associated with a predicted increase in the unemployment rate by 
3.1 percentage points. When we consider the average level of deregulation (a decrease of 0.06 of the 
EPL index) the predicted unemployment rate should increase by 0.4 percentage point. Between 2008 
and 2013, the EPL index fell on average by 0.13 point which is associated with a predicted increase of 
the unemployment rate by 0.9 percentage point. Deregulation in the labour market took place in the 
very last period of our sample, so that the estimated impact could be a short-run effect of deregulation. 
This result is in line with the findings of Cacciatore et al. 2016 and Bordon et al. 2016 who show that 
deregulating the labour market could be detrimental to unemployment in the short run while a positive 
impact (i.e. a reduction of the unemployment rate) occurs only in the long run. This result could have 
an incidence on the decision of policymakers to implement or not a labour market reform.  
  
                                                             
10  See annex 1. 
17
 
 
Table 2: Impact of EPL and PMR on the unemployment rate 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Employment Protection 0.97* -1.37*** -6.56*** -6.36*** -5.96** -6.68** 
 (0.52) (0.37) (1.30) (2.06) (2.57) (2.75) 
Product Market Regulation 3.38*** 6.05*** 3.45*** 3.97*** 3.29*** 3.89*** 
 (0.93) (0.57) (0.93) (1.19) (1.01) (1.18) 
       
Estimator OLS OLS FE IV-FE IV-FE IV-FE 
Control Variables yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Country Fixed effects no no yes yes yes yes 
Year Fixed effects no yes yes yes yes yes 
PMR endogeneity no no no yes no yes 
EPL endogeneity no no no no yes yes 
Adjusted R² 0.83 0.88 0.35 0.39 0.44 0.45 
Number of observations 317 317 317 281 279 277 
       
Weak identification test / / / 327.17 137.34 69.02 
Overidentification test / / / 0.30 0.84 0.60 
Endogeneity test / / / 0.19 0.95 0.42 
Note: (standard errors), *significant at 90%, ** significant at 95%, ***significant at 99%. 
To test this hypothesis, I excluded from the sample countries which implemented the largest 
labour market reforms at the end of the period, namely Portugal, Greece, Spain and Italy. While the 
coefficient of PMR remains the same, even if slightly lower, the effect of employment protection on the 
unemployment rate is reversed, i.e. deregulating the labour market is now beneficial to reduce the 
unemployment rate. As this specification should better capture the long run effect of labour market 
deregulation, results confirm the hypothesis of a negative short run effect but a positive long run effect. 
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Table 3: Robustness checks of the impact of EPL and PMR on the unemployment rate 
 
Baseline 
regression 
Excluding PT, 
GR, ES, IT 
Baseline 
regression with 
interaction term 
Excluding  
PT, GR, ES, IT 
and adding 
interaction term 
Employment Protection -6.56*** 4.21*** -5.91*** 4.18*** 
 (1.30) (1.59) (1.34) (1.61) 
Product Market Regulation 3.45*** 2.83*** 3.53*** 2.82*** 
 (0.93) (0.78) (0.93) (0.78) 
EPL x PMR   6.68** -0.60 
   (3.36) (4.59) 
     
Estimator FE FE FE FE 
Country Fixed effects yes yes yes yes 
Year Fixed effects yes yes yes yes 
Adjusted R² 0.35 0.28 0.36 0.28 
Nb of observations 317 254 317 254 
Note: (standard errors), *significant at 90%, ** significant at 95%, ***significant at 99%. 
Another potential explanation of the negative relationship between EPL and the 
unemployment rate is interaction between labour market and product market regulation. Most 
countries deregulated their product markets, which led to a low PMR index, ranging from 0.91 (the 
Netherlands) to 1.74 (Greece) in 2013. According to Amable et al. (2011), with low levels of PMR, 
employment protection yields a positive and statistically significant effect on employment (and thus 
potentially a reduction in the unemployment rate). Other papers (Fiori et al. 2007, Nicoletti and 
Scarpetta 2005, Griffith et al. 2007) show similar results. Reducing product market regulation is more 
beneficial in terms of employment when the labour market is highly regulated. Adding an interaction 
term in my baseline regression confirm results provided by Amable et al (2011): deregulating the 
labour market is detrimental to unemployment only when product market regulation level is already 
low. However, as long as I exclude Portugal, Greece, Spain and Italy from the regression, there is no 
longer statistically significant impact for the interaction term, while the individual effects of EPL and 
PMR remain. The estimated interaction between both types of deregulation could then also be a short 
run rather than a long run effect. 
2. Regressions by type of product market regulation 
The positive and statistically significant coefficient of product market regulation can hide 
opposite effects. The regressions taking the three types of PMR into account support this statement. 
Government interventions through public ownership and involvement in business operations do not 
appear to be detrimental to the unemployment rate. A decrease in State control by the average level 
of reform observed during the period (-0.32) is associated with a predicted rise in the unemployment 
rate by 0.6 percentage point. This effect seems to come from price controls and command and 
controls rather than public ownership. While the literature on this topic is contradicting, some papers 
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also find State controls to be beneficial to employment (Fiori et al. 2007) or statistically insignificant 
(Boeri et al. 2000, Berger and Danninger 2006). 
The other two components of product market regulation have a positive coefficient. A 
reduction in barriers to entrepreneurship (average level of reform of -0.36 over the period) is 
associated with a statistically significant reduction in the predicted unemployment rate by 1.4 
percentage point. Simplifying regulatory procedures and reducing administrative burdens on start-ups 
have a larger effect than reducing the protection of incumbents (e.g. by removing legal barriers, anti-
trust exemptions, and other barriers to entry). Barriers to trade and investment also have a positive but 
smaller coefficient. A drop by 0.18 (the average level of reform over the period) is associated with a 
decline in the predicted unemployment rate by 0.3 percentage point.  
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3. Regressions by type of employment protection legislation 
The employment protection legislation can be divided by types of contract (regular or 
temporary). For regular contracts, employment protection can refer to individual or collective dismissal 
costs. I estimate the specified unemployment equation for the three types of EPL. While the aggregate 
EPL index has a negative coefficient, the sub-division shows this is only reflected in individual 
dismissal costs and regulation on temporary contracts. The largest effect occurs for individual 
dismissals. Less stringent protection (a fall in the index by on average 0.08) is associated with an 
increase in the predicted unemployment rate by 0.7 percentage point.  
Table 5: Impact of different types of employment protection legislation on unemployment 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Employment Protection       
  1) individual dismissals -0.00 -1.14*** -8.52*** -8.30*** -10.09*** -10.27*** 
 (0.29) (0.28) (1.22) (1.72) (2.13) (2.25) 
  2) collective dismissals 1.31*** 0.20 1.62** 1.77** 3.10*** 3.08*** 
 (0.28) (0.14) (0.73) (0.87) (1.03) (1.03) 
  3) temporary employment 0.48*** 0.47*** -1.22*** -1.49*** -1.60*** -1.54*** 
 (0.17) (0.16) (0.35) (0.48) (0.59) (0.59) 
Product Market Regulation 2.50*** 5.25*** 3.02*** 2.87*** 2.22** 2.73** 
 (0.82) (0.63) (0.92) (1.11) (1.04) (1.18) 
       
Estimator OLS OLS FE IV-FE IV-FE IV-FE 
Control Variables yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Country Fixed effects no no yes yes yes yes 
Year Fixed effects no yes yes yes yes yes 
PMR endogeneity no no no yes no yes 
EPL endogeneity no no no no yes yes 
Adjusted R² 0.84 0.88 0.41 0.47 0.50 0.50 
Number of observations 312 312 312 278 274 274 
       
Weak identification test / / / 282.12 25.66 24.57 
Overidentification test / / / 0.27 0.46 0.43 
Endogeneity test / / / 0.27 0.18 0.26 
Note: (standard errors), *significant at 90%, ** significant at 95%, ***significant at 99% 
To a lesser extent, a lower rate of regulation in the use of temporary contracts (-0.07 on 
average) would also raise the unemployment rate by 0.1 percentage point. Regulation of temporary 
contracts includes rules for fixed-term contracts (valid cases for use of fixed-term contracts, maximum 
number of successive fixed-term contracts and maximum cumulated duration of successive fixed-term 
contracts) as well as rules for temporary work agency employment (types of work for which temporary 
work agency employment is legal, restrictions on the number of renewals, maximum cumulated 
duration and equal treatment of regular and agency workers at the user firm).  
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Deregulation in employment protection legislation for collective redundancies, on the contrary, 
appears to reduce unemployment. However, decrease in the rigidity of rules for collective 
redundancies (such as specific requirements, delays and costs to employers) has been very limited 
over the period, meaning that the average level of reform (-0.03) is predicted to have induced only a 
slightly reduction in the unemployment rate by 0.05 percentage point. 
Since aggregate results were different when excluding some countries, I also tested the 
estimation of sub-components of EPL without Portugal, Greece, Spain and Italy. Interestingly, 
coefficients of individual dismissals and temporary employment become not statistically significant, 
such that different level of regulation has no incidence on the unemployment rate. The only remaining 
effect is coming from collective dismissals which keep a positive and highly statistically significant 
coefficient. In other words, even after controlling for countries which implemented the largest labour 
market reforms during the period, reducing protection against collective dismissals still remains 
beneficial to decrease the unemployment rate11. 
4. Regressions by types of workers 
 Based on the unemployment rates for different categories of workers, I estimated the impact of 
PMR and EPL using fixed-effects regression12. Workers are distinguished by gender, age and 
educational attainment. Three categories are considered for the age of individuals: 15-24 years old, 
25-49 years old and 50-74 years old. Educational levels are provided by degrees and not by years of 
schooling to facilitate comparison by country and to avoid the possibility of repeated grades. The 
categories are based on the International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED). The low 
educational level corresponds to pre-primary education, primary education and lower secondary 
education (levels 0-2 of the ISCED). Middle education corresponds to upper secondary education and 
post-secondary non-tertiary education (levels 3-4). Finally, the high education level corresponds to first 
and second stages of tertiary education (levels 5-6). 
The results show effects in similar directions across types of workers. All estimated 
regressions provide a negative coefficient for EPL, meaning that deregulation raises the 
unemployment rate, and a positive coefficient for PMR which implies that deregulation reduces the 
unemployment rate. The magnitude of the coefficients differs. Analysis by gender shows a larger effect 
of structural reforms on women: a reduction by one standard deviation of PMR reduces the female 
unemployment rate by 1.7 percentage points against only 1.5 percentage points for men. In the case 
of employment protection reforms, a decrease by one standard deviation raises the unemployment 
rate by 3.3 percentage points for women and 2.8 percentage points for men. Nevertheless, for both 
structural reforms, coefficients for men and women are not statistically different for men and women. 
                                                             
11  See annex 3. 
12  Endogeneity tests also show no evidence of reverse causality for different types of workers. As a result, only 
the fixed-effect estimation is presented in this section. 
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Sub-division of workers by age indicates that the impact of deregulation in EPL on the 
unemployment rate is larger for young workers. Reduction in the strictness of employment protection 
increases the unemployment rate by 6 percentage points for 15-24 years old workers, against 3.2 
percentage points for 25 to 49 years old and 2.8 percentage points for workers older than 50. While 
young workers are the most affected, coefficients between the two other age categories are not 
significantly different. Moreover, no statistical differences are observed in terms of product market 
deregulation. 
 The three levels of education are equally impacted by reforms in employment protection 
legislation (the coefficients are not statistically different). Deregulation by one standard deviation 
pushes the unemployment rate up by 2.7 percentage points on average. The effect of product market 
reforms does not differ between low- and middle-educated individuals either, but is significantly lower 
for highly-educated workers. While deregulation in product market reduces the unemployment rate by 
2.2 for low-educated workers and by and 1.6 percentage points for middle-educated people, the 
unemployment rate falls by only 0.6 percentage points for highly-educated workers. 
Results on sub-components of regulation for different types of workers provide similar results 
as the aggregate effect. Moreover, coefficients for all workers and for all sub-components remain of 
the same sign than the baseline regression with the total unemployment rate. In terms of gender, the 
magnitude of the effect is equivalent for all types of regulation except for state control for which the 
effect is greater among men than among women. However, the difference is significant only at 90%. 
The decomposition by age shows that results on the aggregate EPL index hold only for individual 
dismissals and not for collective dismissals and temporary employment. For those two types of 
regulation, results are not statistically different for the three age categories. In terms of PMR, younger 
workers are slightly more impacted than older workers for state controls and barriers to trade and 
investment. Finally, the analysis by level of education shows that results for the aggregate index hide 
some opposing effects. For individual and collective dismissals, middle educated workers are 
significantly more impacted than highly educated workers. On the other hand, regulation on temporary 
contracts has a higher effect on low educated workers. Regarding PMR, we see that highly educated 
workers are significantly less affected by all types of regulation. While on the aggregate index, low and 
middle educated workers are equally impacted, the effect of barriers to entrepreneurship seems to 
slightly affect more low than middle educated workers.  
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V. Conclusion 
This paper provides a robust estimation of the impact of both product and labour market 
regulations on unemployment using data for 24 European countries over the period 1998-2013. I 
contribute to the literature by analysing a longer period of time than previous studies which allows me 
to control for endogeneity of the regulatory variable and to find significant results. Interestingly, the 
endogeneity tests contradict the assumption that effects of structural reforms are endogenous to the 
economic environment. In line with some previous findings, the absence of endogeneity could be 
explained by the fact that the regression estimates the effect of regulation level in year t on the level of 
unemployment rate during the same year. Since structural reforms can take time to be implemented, it 
is reasonable to assume that the unemployment rate does not influence the current level of regulation 
in product and labour markets. 
Controlling for country-fixed effects, endogeneity and various covariates, results show that 
product market deregulation overall reduces unemployment rate. By implementing the average level of 
reform that occurred in the period 1998-2013, a country could decrease its unemployment rate (other 
things being equal) by one percentage point. This finding is robust to all specifications and in line with 
theoretical predictions. The overall positive effect of product market deregulation can be decomposed 
into the effect of deregulation regarding State controls, barriers to entrepreneurship and barriers to 
trade. While a reduction of barriers to entrepreneurship and trade implies a decline in the 
unemployment rate, the reverse occurs for State controls. The estimations suggest that reducing 
government involvement in business operations (such as price controls and command and control 
policies) tends to push up the unemployment rate. 
According to the baseline regression, labour market deregulation, proxied by the employment 
protection legislation index, is detrimental to unemployment: implementing the average level of reform 
that occurred in the period 1998-2013 would increase the unemployment rate (other things being 
equal) by 0.4 percentage point. However, contrary to what is observed in product markets, the trend in 
reducing regulations is less strong in labour markets. Deregulation took place in the very last period of 
the sample, so that the estimated impact could be a short-run effect of deregulation. To test this 
hypothesis, I excluded countries which implemented the largest employment protection reform during 
the last five years from the sample. While the coefficient of product market regulation remains the 
same, even if slightly lower, the effect of employment protection on the unemployment rate is reversed 
and statistically significant. In line with recent empirical and theoretical findings, this result shows that 
deregulating the labour market could be detrimental to unemployment in the short run while a positive 
impact (i.e. a reduction of the unemployment rate) occurs only in the long run. Analysis by sub-
indicators shows that reducing protection against collective dismissals helps in reducing the 
unemployment rate. Moreover, this finding remains true even after controlling for countries which 
implemented the largest labour market reforms. 
This paper also goes further in the analysis by distinguishing unemployed workers by age, 
gender and education. For all types of workers, the sign of the coefficients remains the same as for the 
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aggregate unemployment rate, namely positive for product market regulation and negative for 
employment protection legislation. The magnitude of the impact differs, however. Younger workers 
(aged between 15 and 24 years) are more impacted by labour market regulations than workers aged 
25 and over. The effect is approximately two times bigger. Analysis by level of education shows a 
larger effect of product market deregulation on the unemployment rate of low- and middle-educated 
workers than for highly-educated workers. The effect of employment protection legislation, however, 
does not differ by educational attainment. Finally, men and women are almost equally impacted by 
both types of reforms. 
Further research can be done. First of all, this paper only considers the impact on the 
unemployment rate; it does not provide evidence about the effect on the employment or inactivity 
rates. A reduction in the unemployment rate can result from either a higher employment rate or a 
higher inactivity rate (when workers leave the labour force). The data do not make it possible to 
measure flows into and out of employment, and into and out of the labour force. Secondly, another 
distinction that could be made in addition to the type of regulation and the type of workers is a sectoral 
analysis. It could also be interesting to evaluate which sectors are most affected by deregulation and 
see whether these are the sectors that are creating more jobs.  
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Annex 1 – Descriptive statistics 
 
Number of 
observations Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Min Max 
Average 
variation 
over the 
period 
Unemployment rate  
Total 384 7.9 4.2 1.8 27.5  
   By gender 
      
     Female 384 8.5 4.8 2.2 31.4  
     Male 384 7.5 4.2 1.3 25.6  
   By age 
      
     15-24 years 384 17.9 9.6 4.3 58.3  
     25-49 384 7.1 4.0 1.3 27.8  
     50-74 373 5.5 3.2 0.8 20.3  
   By level of education 
      
     low education 379 13.7 8.8 2.5 53.3  
     middle education 376 7.9 4.7 1.4 31.2  
     high education 369 4.4 2.6 1.2 20.4  
Employment Protection Legislation  
Total 344 2.6 0.5 1.6 4.1 -0.06 
   individual dismissals 344 2.4 0.7 1.0 4.6 -0.08 
   collective dismissals 344 3.2 0.7 1.6 5.1 -0.03 
   temporary employment 338 1.7 1.0 0.3 4.8 -0.07 
Product Market Regulation  
Total 354 1.8 0.4 0.9 3.2 -0.29 
   State Control 354 2.6 0.6 1.2 4.2 -0.32 
      Public ownership 354 3.0 0.8 1.1 5.0 -0.23 
      Price controls and command and control 359 2.1 0.9 0.9 4.8 -0.41 
   Barrier to entrepreneurship 354 2.2 0.5 1.1 3.4 -0.36 
      Regulatory and administrative opacity 354 2.5 0.9 0.4 4.5 -0.44 
      Administrative burdens on startups 359 2.4 0.7 1.1 4.1 -0.29 
      Barrier to competition 354 1.6 0.6 0.6 3.0 -0.36 
   Barrier to trade and investments 359 0.6 0.5 0.1 3.1 -0.18 
      Barriers to FDI, tariffs and discriminatory 
procedures 359 0.3 0.3 0.0 1.6 -0.09 
      Regulatory barriers 359 1.0 0.8 0.2 4.7 -0.27 
Control variables  
Net Replacement Rate 352 39.7 14.7 10.9 74.0  
Union density 375 35.1 22.2 6.5 99.1  
GDP gap (%) 382 0.0 1.8 -10.6 9.3  
Inflation 376 2.8 2.3 -1.7 16.3  
Labor productivity growth 384 1.4 2.4 -6.4 11.4  
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Annex 3 – Excluding PT, GR, ES and IT as robustness check13 
 (1) (2) (1’) (2’) (1’’) (2’’) (1’’’) (2’’’) 
Employment Protection -6.56*** 4.21***   -6.16*** 3.35** -6.21*** 2.76* 
 (1.30) (1.59)   (1.23) (1.49) (1.24) (1.56) 
1) individual dismissals   -8.52*** -0.70     
   (1.22) (1.48)     
2) collective dismissals   1.62** 4.65***     
   (0.73) (0.77)     
3) temporary employment   -1.22*** -0.51     
   (0.35) (0.55)     
Product Market Regulation 3.45*** 2.83*** 3.02*** 2.82***     
 (0.93) (0.78) (0.92) (0.78)     
  1) State Control     -1.74*** -1.54***   
     (0.54) (0.46)   
    a) Public ownership       -0.14 -0.08 
       (0.39) (0.32) 
    b) Price controls and C&C       -2.20*** -1.63*** 
       (0.46) (0.44) 
  2) Barrier to entrepreneurship     3.91*** 3.21***   
     (0.72) (0.64)   
    a) Regulatory and admin opacity       1.43*** 1.29*** 
       (0.29) (0.24) 
    b) Administrative burdens on startups       2.24*** 1.88*** 
       (0.56) (0.58) 
    c) Barrier to competition       0.48 -0.68 
       (0.57) (0.56) 
  3) Barrier to trade and investment     1.53*** 1.34***   
     (0.47) (0.39)   
    a) Barriers to FDI       1.89* 0.82 
       (1.10) (0.92) 
    b) Regulatory barriers       0.29 0.71** 
       (0.38) (0.34) 
         
Estimator FE FE FE FE FE FE FE FE 
Adjusted R² 0.35 0.28 0.41 0.33 0.43 0.38 0.45 0.42 
Nb of observations 317 254 312 249 317 254 317 254 
Note: (standard errors), *significant at 90%, ** significant at 95%, ***significant at 99%. 
                                                             
13  Regressions (1) are baseline regressions, regressions (2) are estimations excluding Portugal, Greece, Spain 
and Italy. 
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